SUBIN
Inter-organizational collaboration in the governance of subsurface infrastructure networks Wat zijn de beste coördinatieoplossingen voor complexe,...
BekijkOn Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Games & Their Applications in the Optimal Toll Design Problem, the Energy Markets Liberalization Problem, and in the Theory of Incentives
This thesis studies the so-called inverse Stackelberg games, that are new in the world of game theory, their properties, and their applications in the optimal toll design problem, the energy markets liberalization problem, and in the theory of incentives.
Onderzoek
Publicatiedatum
02-02-2009
Auteur
K. Stankova
Contributor(s)
G.J. Olsder (promotor) M.C.J. Bliemer (promotor)
Universiteit
TU Delft
Faculteit
Mathematics and Computer Science
